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The focus of the current topic is the
analysis and interpretation of second lan-
guage (L2) and multilingual data. Looking
at data from speakers who have learned
their additional languages after the mother
tongue has become well established is of
special interest. It advances our knowl-
edge about how different language systems
share space in the same mind, a ques-
tion to be asked of any kind of multi-
lingual at any age—and secondly it can
tell us more about potential differences
between early and later learned languages
(Kim et al., 1997; Kovelman et al., 2008).
More recent research points to brain areas
activated in late learners of L2s becoming
more and more like those of L1 acquir-
ers as their proficiency advances (Green,
2003). At earlier stages of acquisition,
adults may simply adopt compensatory
strategies, for example recruiting new cog-
nitive resources that have become avail-
able with increasing maturity to complete
communicative tasks that are demanding
either because, unlike very young children,
they personally want or are compelled
by interlocutors to communicate complex
ideas, or because the requirements of a
given experiment simply make the tasks
demanding. This will therefore implicate
regions of the brain that are much less
involved in young language users and these
may stay involved even where higher levels
of L2 ability render themmuch less impor-
tant or even unnecessary. In any case, to get
the full picture we need ways of tracking
this strategic activity, one aspect of which
is the deployment of explicit processes,
both those involving conscious awareness
and those that may be raised to aware-
ness but can also operate subconsciously
but there will surely be processes that only
operate subconsciously as well (Sharwood
Smith and Truscott, 2011). These will
affect not only the spontaneous uses of L1
and L2 but also performance on experi-
mental tasks. Tracking brain activity with
sophisticated apparatus is not enough of
course: the data needs to be analyzed and
for this we need very sophisticated theoret-
ical frameworks to guide interpretation.
While research techniques such as brain
imaging are gradually acquiring greater
precision, helping to reveal much more
about brain activity associated with lin-
guistic processing, there still remain many
problems interpreting results. This may
not be an immediate problem in a given
experiment because the research ques-
tion may be suitably precise and focussed
enough to guarantee an answer of sorts in
the hope that answers to limited questions
may gradually accumulate and provide the
basis for wider explanations. In this way,
for example, syntactic and semantic pro-
cessing can be teased apart on the basis of
participants’ differing responses to exam-
ples of, respectively, syntactic and seman-
tic anomaly which then allows researchers
to identify separate neural signatures and
provide support for particular accounts
of the status of language vis-a-vis other
types of cognition. Issues of interpretation
become more evident when trying to put
results into a wider explanatory context.
One problem concerns the choice of which
theory and which concepts and categories
to import from a neighboring research
domain. Another one, related to that, is
locating conceptual models and frame-
works in related domains (neurolinguis-
tic, psycholinguistic, theoretical linguistic)
that can be combined in such a way as to
promise the best possible explanation.
Assuming the focus is on explaining
language, and leaving aside sociolinguis-
tic issues, if we get down to the basics,
what do we have? 1.3 kilos (three pounds)
of soft tissue and our current understand-
ing of its functional architecture. Add to
that theories about psychological func-
tion and, in many cases at least, entirely
separate, well developed theories about
linguistic structure. Each of these theo-
ries has, for very good reasons, its own
conceptual framework and terminology,
and its own favorite methods of inves-
tigation. For satisfactory explanations of
how the brain stores and processes lan-
guages, we need somehow to coordinate
findings in all these different disciplines.
At the same time, it is not a straight-
forward job to bootstrap, for example, a
Minimalist approach to explaining lan-
guage structure to a model of human
memory and make it into a real-time
processing theory. This is true notwith-
standing the obvious need, in the elab-
oration of theories of processing and
development, for fine-grained accounts
of linguistic structure. Standard gener-
ative linguistic approaches to language
employ terms and concepts to explain
abstract linguistic structure that are out-
side time and space. Without going into
the details, these are notions like “move,”
a structure-building operation changing
the position of some item in a struc-
ture, “merge,” a combining operation, and
“feature-checking,” the process whereby
two associated items in a structure are
assessed to see if they can be “licensed,”
i.e., co-exist in their current position (in
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a particular manner determined by the
theory). The use of such spatiotempo-
ral metaphors, without any responsibility
for explaining processing facts, is a highly
effective device for describing structural
relationships in syntax. At the same time
these metaphors should not be translated
straightforwardly into real-time, on-line
processing terms. If they were thus inter-
preted, that would constitute a serious
category error—confusing abstract theo-
retical linguistic concepts for ones that are
custom designed to describe and explain
events in real time. Either that, or it would
constitute a new and different type of
claim entirely, i.e., that the abstract con-
cepts can do double duty and describe
real-time events as well. Unless there is
such a claim, working with linguistic the-
ory means operating at a different level
of description from psycholinguistic pro-
cessing theory. Yet another level, distinct
from both of those ones, seeks to provide
neurolinguistic descriptions and explana-
tions (Sabourin and Haverkort, 2003).
Again, there is no guaranteed simple and
straightforward translation of psychologi-
cal explanations into neurofunctional ones
either. In a psychological description, a
working memory (WM) may be described
as, say, a single module where its neural
substrate is seen as being distributed over,
say, three different systems, each located in
different areas of the brain. If the model of
memory is a modular one, the number of
subsystems can still be different depending
on whether the description is psychologi-
cal or neurological.
Although functional models in psy-
cholinguistics do not have to match their
linguistic and neurolinguistic counterparts
in any literal way, the need to interpret
one into terms of the other does have
to be acknowledged so that the search
for, or development of compatible mod-
els across disciplines can proceed. While
research continues sorting out the “easier”
problems of data collection and analysis
within each of these three disciplines, it is
still useful to cast a critical eye on many
of the basic assumptions being made and
raise some questions about them. It is
fair to point out that with the increasing
sophistication of techniques that record
brain activity, the problem of resolv-
ing the bigger questions will gradually
become more tractable but only provided
that suitable theoretical, compatible, well-
founded models in companion domains
can be identified so that the bigger ques-
tions can be formulated.
To take memory as a case in point, what
is the relationship between on-line lan-
guage processing, in this case by bilinguals
(multilinguals) and the formation of new
stable memories? How and where are the
relevant memories formed? Should differ-
ent types ofmemory be assumed as is often
the case nowadays. If so, how many? Let
us begin, say, with the initial registering of
the acoustic stream: if we can accept that
auditory-acoustic memories are formed
in the primary auditory cortex, where
and how is the subset of those memo-
ries that are identified as language-relevant
processed further, thereby forming (some
claim) separate types of memory? Is it
legitimate to talk, for example, of a sin-
gle separate “linguistic memory” system
or are there in fact two separate types
of memory involved, phonological and
syntactic (Jackendoff, 2002; Truscott and
Sharwood Smith, 2004; Sharwood Smith
and Truscott, 2014)? Moving on to WM,
is this part of a unified system serv-
ing all types of cognitive and percep-
tual activity or is WM also modular and
domain-specific? If so, which modules and
which domains are we talking about? And,
during repeated on-line processing, when
items that have appeared in (one or other
instances of) WM have eventually become
stable and established items in longer
term memory (LTM), should we treat
this acquisition process as resulting from
the successful transition of the relevant
items from one memory system (WM)
into another one (LTM) or, alternatively,
should we treat WM and LTM as part of
a single memory system thereby charac-
terizing acquisition as establishment of an
enduring trace in LTM that then becomes
increasingly accessible over time (Cowan,
2005; Baddeley, 2012)? It might not mat-
ter which option you choose for some
purposes but if the models are going
to be useful they may each have differ-
ent empirical consequences when applied
to the more complex questions of lin-
guistic acquisition and performance. The
plain fact is that models being used today
still do not yet specify exactly how lan-
guage systems are stored and used within
one mind/brain. A much more detailed
architecture is required to required tomeet
this requirement and explain how dis-
course/pragmatic, semantic, morphosyn-
tactic and semantic features are stored and
interact across a single or across multiple
language systems (see, for example, pro-
posals in Sharwood Smith and Truscott,
2014).
Connected with the decisions about
which model of memory and storage to
use is the question whether or not there
is anything like a “language acquisition
device” and if there is one, how does it
work? What is its neural substrate? To take
representational models of cognition, for
example, some assign a special status to
human language while others treat it as
part of general cognition. The emergen-
tist architecture proposed by O’Grady is
an example of the latter (O’Grady, 2000).
O’Grady explains language acquisition as
cognitive development that is driven by
the selection of ever more efficient pro-
cessing operations to handle the input.
One such operation seeks to minimize
the burden on WM. Sharwood Smith and
Truscott’s account is similar at least in this
one respect, denying the need for a lan-
guage acquisition device, whereas Carroll’s
Autonomous Induction Model is different
and posits a modular, failure-driven acqui-
sition mechanism that is unique to lan-
guage (Carroll, 2001, 2007; see discussion
in Truscott and Sharwood Smith, 2004;
Sharwood Smith et al., 2012; Sharwood
Smith and Truscott, 2014). In any study
of acquisition, it is fair to ask what
background theoretical commitments the
researchers are making and to what extent
it is a matter of principled choice or just
one of convenience, understandable as that
might be.
My final example is the notion “rep-
resentation.” If we set aside non-symbolic
accounts, somewhere along the line we
have to have a clear idea of how to treat
representations at the different levels of
description (and explanation) that we have
been dealing with, ranging from simple
ones like “word,” “syllable,” and “lexical
item” to ones like “noun,” phonological
and syntactic “features” and the whole
gamut of theoretical categories that we
wish to deploy in some form or other for
experimental investigation and data analy-
sis. Representations may be psychological
constructs but they should have neural
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correlates. For example, Damasio’s notion
of “dispositional representation” meshes
easily with the way linguistic or psy-
chological representations are conceived.
A dispositional representation is “a poten-
tial pattern of neuron activity in small
ensembles of neurons and may be dis-
tributed over a number of different loca-
tions in the cortex, the precise locations
depending on the type of representation
and whether it is innate or acquired as
a result of experience” (Damasio, 1994,
pp. 102–105). This provides another illus-
tration of how the neural equivalent
of a psychological representation located
in one particular place in a theoretical
model can be a structure that is dis-
tributed across the neural system in dif-
ferent places. It also shows, incidentally,
that you do not need to choose between
symbolic representational accounts on the
one hand and connectionist accounts
based on (biological) neural networks on
the other. Networks, representations and
modular architectures can live peacefully
together.
To some extent this short discussion is
more a look into the future than a critique
of past and present research. It is some-
what of a cliché to say research in this area
needs to be conducted by teams from dif-
ferent research domains. To some extent
this is already happening. My basic point is
that the development of useful conceptual
frameworks that can support such multi-
disciplinary research is still in its infancy. I
have my own suggestions about what such
a framework might look like but that is
another story.
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